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Dr. Jan C. Schuhr, Erlangen / Germany
 
 
Free Will, Robots, and the Axiom of Choice
1 
 
Abstract: There are quite a number of similarities between the moral concept of choice and 
the mathematical axiom of choice. These similarities shed light on how to adapt law to solve 
cases that arise with the increasing “autonomy” of robots. 
Keywords:  free  will,  choice,  determinism,  indeterminism,  axiom  of  choice,  mathematics, 
robot, law, Immanuel Kant 
 
I. Introduction 
Quite a number of humanities  discuss  choice as  characteristic of human action.  In many 
mathematical theories (and thus also in many theories of physics and other sciences), the 
axiom of choice is essential. Do the moral concept of choice and the mathematical axiom of 
choice have anything in common? They do. There are actually a multitude of similarities. 
These  similarities  indicate  that  the  traditional  discussion  of  legal  rules  tends  to 
overestimate the role choice plays and that robots might even legitimately be regarded as 
subjects of certain legal rules one day, rather than doomed to remain mere legal objects. I will 
not provide a complete argument that they will because that would entail massive speculation 
about the future development of robots, their planning skills, and the law. What I will do is 
explain and analyze the common features of the moral concept of choice and the axiom of 
choice, first indicating how this observation can serve as a module of an argument suitably 
included into future reasoning and how this observation relates to robots. 
 
II. The nimbus of choice 
In  legal  contexts,  free  will  and  actions  are  a  common  basis  of  arguments.  Usually  this 
argument follows the following pattern:  
  Some rule presupposes choice. 
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  But no free act was committed. 
  Thus the rule is not applicable in this situation.  
In the same manner even more radical  results  can be obtained:  No object  ever exercises 
choice; objects do not act at all. Thus, rules that presuppose choice never apply to a mere 
object. Moreover, concepts that presuppose choice can never be used adequately with regard 
to a mere object. Hence it would seem that rules and concepts like these were always inapt for 
robots.  
The argument is compelling; its application, however, can become quite problematic. 
The argument refers to choice as if it were a monolithic block. Therefore one can frequently 
encounter arguments  constructed according to  this  pattern  yet  oversimplifying the subject 
matter. For example, penalties require guilt and guilt requires choice. But just like guilt is 
actually  incremental  –  which  the  law  recognizes,  e.g.  in  § 21  StGB  (= German  Criminal 
Code) – so is choice. It is wrong to treat choice and the applicability of rules and concepts that 
presuppose choice as all-or-nothing issues. Rather differentiated answers are necessary and 
my observation is meant to motivate them. 
There is one issue we handle especially simplistically today: Only human beings can 
have  choice.  For  them  we  often  recognize  different  gradations  of  choice  and  even 
circumstances that exclude choice in a given situation. Time and again freedom of human will 
and  actions  even  gets  categorically  contested.  But  no  other  real  beings  –  and  even  less 
inanimate objects – would be said to exercise choice. Only juridical persons are sometimes 
treated as having choice. Mostly we do not classify them at all in the categories of choice or 
no-choice but tacitly apply the rules made for natural persons to them. And at times they 
receive differentiated treatment, e.g. regarding their decision-making. 
Sooner or later we might have to consider a similarly differentiated treatment of some 
robots. For the reason indicated supra, this idea will not be developed here any further. Still at 
least some authority – albeit not considering this specific question, but nonetheless covering 
the fundamental issue – may be quoted in this respect. Kant holds that in practical interaction 
we need to presume choice.
2 In his practical philosophy, he examines „reasonable beings,“ 
particularly in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.
3 Humans are a degenerated 
form of these beings for they do not always act reasonably.
4 In Kant’s view, freedom is 
always a question of degree and as far as beings act in the real world they can never reach the 
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pure form of freedom. This is especially true for humans. And next to these “only somewhat 
free beings” there is still plenty of room for some “even less free beings.”  
It seems we often quite unconsciously pin a nimbus of uniqueness to the concept of 
choice. Humans like that nimbus to shine onto, and hope it will be reserved for, them. This 
tendency makes rational treatment of choice more difficult than it should be. Not only can 
choice never be proven empirically, it is not a characteristic of “real” events at all and thus 
cannot establish any “real” quality humans would like to have. Choice is a necessary model 
assumption in (practical) theories of action. In these theories it serves a technical purpose. The 
nimbus,  however,  builds  a  psychological  barrier  to  considering  a  degree  of  freedom  for 
robots, or better, to considering adapting legal constructions, which traditionally presuppose 
choice,  and  making  them  applicable  to  robots.  Countless  works  of  science  fiction  have 
documented this barrier at length.  
My observations should undermine that nimbus. 
 
III. Qualities of the moral concept of choice 
The idea of choice includes a couple of elements that nourish its nimbus. In my observations, 
I will show that these elements can also be detected for the mathematical axiom of choice. 
While moral philosophers and lawyers will certainly not get excited about that idea, they also 
should not get so excited about these aspects of choice in the first place: 
1.  On the face of it, the assumption of choice seems clear at first blush. We experience 
ourselves as deciding on our own actions and perceive other people in the same way. 
Our decisions even seem to be what defines us as human. Not until we give deeper 
thought to this assumption does it become problematic.  
2.  We picture an act of choice as an active selection between different options. 
3.  A complete explanation of actions is impossible. This is because it is impossible to give 
a  detailed  reconstruction  of  the  “choosing”  involved.  It  cannot  be  analyzed  into 
elementary steps  that would  necessarily  be  repeated in  the same way  under similar 
circumstances at another time. 
4.  Hence choices are ultimately always unpredictable. They can never be reconstructed in 
a deductive system based on empirical premises. 
5.  It is not even possible to provide a precise formulation of the options that existed before 
the choice or at least the option that was finally chosen. The options and the act actually 
performed (which is the result of the choosing) can only be described in an approximate 
manner. 4 
6.  Consistent  models  of  human  actions  can  be  based  on  the  assumption  of  choice. 
However, deterministic models – meaning models which exclude choice – can be just as 
consistent.
5 
7.  Theories based on the assumption of choice can usually be much more comprehensive 
with regard to the moral and especially legal status of human actions.  
8.  Realizing that both the assumption of choice and the assumption of determinism can 
each be part of consistent theories (not both at the same time of course) gives rise to 
very  productive  questions:  What  really  depends  on  the  assumption  of  choice  or 
determinism  respectively?  And  what  can  be  established  independently  of  these 
assumptions, i.e. consistently with both of them?  
These elements are important characteristics of freedom of will and actions, even though they 
are  certainly  not  exhaustive.  They  seem,  however,  to  contain  the  essential  basis  for  the 
nimbus – especially those mentioned first. 
 
IV. Concordance with the axiom of choice 
The axiom of choice is a thought construct of pure mathematics. It does not concern actions, 
evaluations,  or  descriptions  of  the  real  world.  Accordingly,  it  is  neither  the  subject  of  a 
normative nor of an empirical theory. In a manner of speaking, it belongs to the chamber of 
horrors for everyone trying to focus on more practical matters. 
The axiom of choice applies to sets. It assumes an arbitrary amount of sets (but at least 
one) as given. None of these sets may be empty, but each can be arbitrarily large. They need 
not match in any way  – neither in size nor content. The axiom of choice consists of the 
assumption that there always is a mapping – called the choice function – that maps each set to 
one of its own elements.
6 (For example, given the sets {1, 2, 3}, {11, 12} and {21}, the first 
set could be mapped to 2, the second set to 12, and the third set here must be mapped to 21, 
for this is its only element.) 
In modern mathematics, axioms do not contain any claim to tru th.
7 Thus the axiom of 
choice is only an assumption, indispensable in some mathematical theories, axiomatically 
established to obtain its own consequences, which the theory treats. It simply formulates a 
                                                           
5 Cf. e.g. Michael S. Moore, Placing Blame – A General Theory of the Criminal Law, 1997, esp. 504 ff., 617 f. 
6 Cf. Imre Leader, The axiom of choice, in: The Princeton Companion to Mathematics, ed. by T. Gowers et al., 
2008, III.1, p. 158. 
7 See Hans Freudenthal, »Axiomatik«, in: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, ed. by J. Ritter, K. Gründer, 
G. Gabriel, vol. 1 (1971); H. C. Kennedy, The Origins of Modern Axiomatics,  The American Mathematical 
Monthly, 79 (1972), 133 ff. concerning the development of Hilbert’s and Ackermann’s concept of an axiom and 
its deviation from  Aristotle’s  and Euklid’s concept. For the  formulation of that concept see David Hilbert/ 
Wilhelm Ackermann, Grundzüge der theoretischen Logik, 6
th ed. (1972), § 8, p. 22 (just as in the 1
st ed., 1928). 5 
logical precondition – if it is fulfilled the desired consequences follow, if not the theory is 
inapplicable to the situation. Pure mathematics is pure exactly because it does not consider the 
applicability of its theories to pose a mathematical problem. In fact mathematical theories 
using the axiom of choice find very broad application
8 – in the end mostly without even the 
possibility to prove that the preconditions of the axiom of choice are met in any strict sense. 
The axiom of choice shares this characteristic with the moral concept of choice. But for 
neither the mathematical axiom nor the moral concept is this similarity specific. It merely 
results from the fact that both have an axiomatic character and the users of theories usually 
are  more  interested  in  their  results  than  in  paying  attention  to  their  preconditions. 
Furthermore, the mathematical axiom of choice shares all the characteristics listed above with 
the moral concept:  
1.  On the face of it, the axiom of choice seems self-evident: Since the sets are given, why 
should it be a problem to select elements? Indeed there is no problem as long as only a 
finite number of sets are involved. Yet arbitrarily many sets may be given – especially 
infinitely many, a simple example being that only countably infinitely many sets are 
given  (i.e.  only  as  many  as  there  are  natural  numbers).  Even  then  the  selection  of 
elements would take much too long for any human to actually perform all necessary 
choices during one lifetime. At least a selection process would be “construable” in the 
following way: Imagine someone who processes set by set and picks one element from 
each. This someone would never get finished with all sets. However, (if that someone had 
eternal life) every set would be processed after a finite period of time (that differs from 
set to set, exceeds every possible boundary, yet always remains finite). Yet these are only 
the “harmless” cases. In the world of mathematics, finite or countably infinite sets are 
pretty small. Even the real numbers are no longer countable. Therefore it would suffice to 
take as many sets as there are real numbers, and it would be absolutely impossible for 
humans to imagine how the choice function could ever be construed. On second thought, 
choice in mathematics is therefore just as mysterious as in moral philosophy. 
2.  We picture the content of the axiom of choice as a step-by-step selection process. For 
each set all its elements are options to select from and only one gets chosen. Accordingly, 
we actually picture the choice function as act-decisions (which also is why the axiom is 
called axiom of choice). 
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3.  Only in special cases can the choice function be explicitly formulated (esp. when merely 
a  small  amount  of  sets  is  given  or  special  characteristics  of  the  given  sets  make  a 
description of the selection possible – e.g. in case each set contains a zero the choice 
function can be described as “always select the zero”). In the general case, however, 
formulating the choice function is impossible; being “non-constructive” is just what the 
axiom of choice is about. Its demand for mathematical existence of the choice function 
only means that (1) the idea of such a function does not contradict the other axioms and 
that  (2)  all  considerations  based  on  the  axiom  of  choice  may  presuppose  a  choice 
function.  In  contrast  that  does  not  mean  that  a  process  can  be  defined  which  would 
actually effect the choosing of an element from each set – just like no process can be 
formulated, which would fully explain human decisions to act. 
4.  Just  like  actions  are  generally  unpredictable  there  is  no  way  to  tell  what  the  choice 
function (or the set of all selected elements) would actually look like. 
5.  In the analogy explained above a single act-decision corresponds to the selection of one 
element from one of the given sets. In every set each of its elements could be selected, 
thus it is a choice-option and corresponds to an option for the act-decision. Just like an 
option to act can never be described in an exhaustive manner neither can (in the general 
case)  the  choice-option.  That  is  because  the  meaning  of  “given  sets”  is  inherently 
problematic. The sets do not need to be listed anywhere; oftentimes it would not even be 
possible to list them since there can be uncountably – and therefore “unlistably” – many 
sets.  The  same  is  especially  true  for  the  elements  of  those  sets.  Consequently,  the 
requirement that sets need to be given is very abstract. Still nobody who is used to talking 
about options and decisions to act – which are presumed despite the fact that they can 
never be expressed in an exact manner – should feel confused by that abstractness. 
6.  Many  mathematical  theories  are  consistent  with  both  the  axiom  of  choice  and  its 
negation, just like both the assumption of choice and the assumption of determinism can 
be part of theories of actions (not both at the same time, of course). 
7.  So many important mathematical theories contain the axiom of choice that few of today's 
mathematicians would seriously think about sacrificing that axiom. Core parts of analysis 
and algebra, for example, are based on the axiom of choice or equivalent premises. 7 
8.  Mathematicians have put great effort into analyzing which theorems need the axiom of 
choice  or  an  equivalent  assumption  and  which  theorems  are  also  consistent  with  its 
negation.
9  
This list shows a complete correspondence of the characteristics first explained for the 
moral concept of choice and now for the mathematical axiom. It would therefore be a 
fundamental error to attribute those characteristics to the nature of humans. Of course in some 
sense even the axiom of choice depends on human nature, because this axiom only “exists” in 
their minds. But it still is just a more or less arbitrary assumption made for the benefit of its 
consequences. It is a technical means to construct desired theories. But it has no ontological 
basis – especially not in humanity. 
The observed parallels suggest that the same might be true for the moral concept of 
choice. Simultaneously it suggests that there is no reason to abolish the moral assumption of 
choice, but rather that it is necessary to handle it without emotional baggage. 
I do not want to claim that my observations are new. Although I do not know of any 
thorough  analysis  of  the  similarities  between  the  moral  concept  of  choice  and  the 
mathematical axiom, the parallels are widely understood in a more general sense. The fact 
that both are named “choice” already indicates this similarity. 
 
V. Outlook 
Back to the robots! They are machines constructed by humans, and thus they – like their 
creators – will most certainly never be able to define the choice function in the general case. 
Their capabilities may exceed those of humans with regard to the speed and resilience with 
which they can select from defined options, but it is practically certain that they will never be 
able to handle uncountably infinite selections in any way that would principally exceed the 
capabilities of humans. This is simply due to the fact that it would not even be possible to 
define the options they would have to choose from. 
Nevertheless one day we might have robots whose behavior can only be explained on the 
basis of a theory that contains the axiom of choice (e.g. because the physical theory that 
explains one of the robot’s components needs mathematical methods which depend on that 
axiom). Today’s robots, with huge but still finite memory, processing states, and possibilities 
of input given at any time, do not come near that threshold and I do not want to make any 
guesses regarding the likelihood that this will ever happen. But if it happens, then those robots 
                                                           
9 With the words of Saharon Shelah/ Alexander Soifer, Axiom of choice and chromatic number of the plane, 
JCTA (Journal of combinatorial theory, Ser. A) 103 (2003), 387, 388: „So, it is natural to ask, what if we have no 
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would have reached the point where their behavior matches human actions in all of the eight 
characteristics discussed here. 
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